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FACTS AND FICTIONS OF CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
Masaki Iwasaki*
U.S. Senator and former Democratic presidential contender Elizabeth
Warren recently proposed the Corporate Executive Accountability Act, a bill
that lowers the level of mental state required to prosecute executives for any
corporate crime. A nationwide debate has been raging over this Act, but
most arguments have focused on the appropriateness of the relaxed
requirement, and the whole picture of executive accountability is vague. This
Essay reveals what the facts and fictions of corporate executive
accountability are, focusing on the degree of punishment of criminal
executives. The author presents the estimates of expected direct and indirect
punishments of executives and considers other options to deter corporate
crimes, options that could be used with or without the proposed Act.
INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2019, U.S. Senator and former Democratic presidential
contender Elizabeth Warren proposed a bill titled the Corporate Executive
Accountability Act1 (the “Act”), which would dramatically change the
enforcement of corporate criminal law if the bill is enacted. In many
corporate crimes, an intent to commit a crime is required for criminal liability
and mere negligence is not sufficient. However, the Act relaxes this standard
to negligence for any corporate crime;2 under the Act, it will be unlawful for
an executive of a corporation with more than $1 billion in revenue to
negligently permit or fail to prevent a corporate offense.3
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1. S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019).
2. Id. § 2.
3. Id.
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While the Act has been endorsed by several influential organizations such
as Public Citizen and Americans for Financial Reform,4 some have fiercely
questioned the desirability of the Act.5 Most arguments over the Act have
focused on the appropriateness of the relaxed requirement, and it is unclear
to what extent this type of reform is necessary and whether other options
exist. Different views seem to implicitly assume that the punishment of
executives is currently either sufficient or insufficient, but those views rarely
show empirical support for their assumptions.
This Essay reveals the facts and fictions of corporate executive
accountability, focusing on the punishment of criminal executives. The aim
of this short piece is not to discuss the desirability of the Act, which would
require a substantial number of pages. Rather, this Essay presents estimates
of the expected punishment of executives to show that the current deterrence
of corporate crime is probably insufficient. Then the author explores other
options we may have in order to improve deterrence. The options featured
here are whistleblower reward programs and corporate self-reporting
schemes. These options could be used with or without the Act. Readers’
judgment on the Act would be facilitated if other options are presented at the
same time.
Part I presents the rough estimates of expected direct and indirect
punishments of criminal executives. Part II shows how whistleblower
reward programs can improve the enforcement of corporate criminal law.
Part III considers whether and how corporate self-reporting schemes can
enhance deterrence. Part IV concludes.
I. DIRECT AND INDIRECT PUNISHMENTS OF CRIMINAL EXECUTIVES
If an executive commits a corporate crime, this individual is exposed to
two expected punishments: direct and indirect punishments. If the executive
is prosecuted and convicted, this person will suffer direct punishment, such
as fines and imprisonment. Moreover, the executive may suffer indirect
punishment through a reduction in his or her wealth if a company suffers a
corporate sanction. In U.S. public companies, executives such as chief
executive officers (CEOs), receive significant stocks and options as their
compensation.6 If a company is sanctioned, its value will decrease, and its

4. See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator Warren Unveils Bill to Expand Criminal
Liability to Negligent Executives of Giant Corporations (Apr. 3, 2019), https://
www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-unveils-bill-to-expandcriminal-liability-to-negligent-executives-of-giant-corporations
[https://perma.cc/P4G359G2].
5. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & Benjamin Levin, Elizabeth Warren’s Proposal to
Imprison More Corporate Executives Is a Bad Idea, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:39 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/elizabeth-warren-corporate-fraud-prisonnegligence-mass-incarceration.html [https://perma.cc/ADP7-JBJ5].
6. See, e.g., David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, CEO Compensation: Data Spotlight,
STAN.
GRADUATE
SCH.
BUS.:
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
RES.
INITIATIVE,
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executives’ compensation may decrease as well. If corporate crimes are
detected, companies may need to disgorge illicit profits, pay fines, and suffer
reputational loss, all of which reduce their stock prices and thus reduce the
wealth of their executives.
Given this background, this Essay attempts to roughly estimate the
expected direct and indirect punishments of CEOs of U.S. public companies,
based on data from prior literature.7 The results are presented in Table 1.
We first calculate the probabilities of detecting a corporate crime and
prosecuting a CEO. For fraud cases of large U.S. public companies, I. J.
Alexander Dyck et al. estimated that the probability of detecting a crime is
approximately 33 percent.8 We can also calculate the conditional probability
of prosecuting a CEO given a crime detection, based on the study of Brandon
L. Garrett.9 His sample includes 306 deferred and non-prosecution
agreements with U.S. public and private companies, with the sample period
ranging from 2001 to 2014.10 In these cases, 26 CEOs were prosecuted,11
and thus the conditional probability of CEO prosecution can be estimated as
8.5 percent.
Executives, including CEOs, do not necessarily engage in corporate crimes
even if their company commits crimes. If so, the true conditional probability
of CEO prosecution would be higher than 8.5 percent. However, the
estimated number would not be significantly different from the actual
number. Executives often play a leadership role in large-scale corporate
crimes, but they are rarely prosecuted.12 Prosecuting individuals is
practically more difficult than prosecuting corporations.13
Next, we calculate the direct punishment. According to Garrett’s study,
the mean fine is $381,000 for individuals prosecuted and fined, and the mean
jail time is 18 months for individuals sentenced.14 Hence, by multiplying (1)
these numbers by (2) the probability of crime detection by (3) the conditional
probability of CEO prosecution, the expected direct punishment can be
roughly estimated at a fine of $10,687 and a jail time of 0.5 months. One
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-quick-guide-17-ceocompensation-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TFF-HXYJ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
7. The explanation of Table 1 draws on the analysis in Masaki Iwasaki, A Model of
Corporate Self-Policing and Self-Reporting (Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper
Series No. 88, 2019), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/
pdf/Iwasaki_88.pdf [https://perma.cc/9672-4JWJ].
8. I. J. Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 2 (2017) (unpublished
manuscript). An earlier version of the paper is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222608 [https://perma.cc/RU7R-BLSQ].
9. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789
(2015).
10. Id. at 1791. Data including only public companies is not available.
11. Id. at 1802.
12. See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL?: INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE
MALFEASANCE, AND GOVERNMENT INACTION 5 (2014).
13. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 57 (1993).
14. Garrett, supra note 9, at 1813, 1833.
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caveat is that the true direct punishment of CEOs is likely to be higher than
the estimated value because the data of the mean fines and jail time includes
both senior executives and lower-level employees. But even if the fine
amount is adjusted upward, because of the low probabilities of crime
detection and CEO prosecution, the expected direct punishment would still
be low. Another caveat is that CEOs may suffer reputational loss and face
the risk of dismissal, which are not calculated here because it is difficult to
obtain data for that calculation.
Lastly, regarding the indirect punishment, according to David Larcker and
Brian Tayan, a 1 percent change in stock price leads to a median change of
$193,000 in CEO wealth for U.S. public companies.15 Furthermore,
according to a study by Jason Pierce, corporate prosecution decreases the
stock price of a U.S. public company by approximately 11 percent.16
Therefore, by multiplying (1) the probability of crime detection by (2) the
change in CEO wealth with a 1 percent stock price change by (3) the impact
of corporate prosecution on stock price, the expected indirect punishment can
be estimated at $700,590.
These data suggest that the total expected punishment of executives is
unlikely to be sufficiently large relative to the expected illicit profits to these
individuals from committing crimes. Indeed, illicit profits from corporate
crimes are known to be huge in many cases when compared to the amounts
of fines.17 The data also imply that the expected direct punishment may not
significantly increase even if the probability of crime detection is increased
because the conditional probability of CEO prosecution, the expected amount
of fines, and the expected length of imprisonment remain at low levels.
Although CEOs may be exposed to additional punishments, such as
reputational loss and dismissal, these costs are unlikely to be high because of
the low probability of executive prosecution.
The gist of the Act is to raise the conditional probability of CEO
prosecution by easing the existing difficulties of proof. While the Act would
have social benefits from enhancing deterrence, it may also have social costs.
Thus, the social benefits and costs from introducing the Act should be
carefully evaluated. The desirability of this particular solution is beyond the
scope of this paper, but the estimates above at least demonstrate that some
changes would be necessary to improve deterrence. In order to enhance
deterrence, there are three options: (1) increasing the probability of crime
detection, (2) raising the conditional probability of executive prosecution,
and (3) imposing greater fines and longer prison sentences. Increasing fines
and the length of sentences may be difficult because their maximum values
are constrained by factors such as considerations of fairness and the wealth
15. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 6.
16. Jason R. Pierce, Reexamining the Cost of Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 44 J.
MGMT. 892, 911 (2018).
17. See, e.g., John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Does Crime Pay?: Cartel Penalties
and Profits, ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 29, 33.
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of wrongdoers,18 and thus this Essay focuses on the first two measures in the
next two parts.
Table 1: Direct and Indirect Punishments of CEOs
1. Probabilities
Probability of crime detection
Conditional
probability
of
prosecution
2. Direct punishment
Individual fine
Jail time
Expected direct punishment

CEO

3. Indirect punishment
Change in CEO wealth with 1% stock
change
Impact of corporate prosecution on stock
price
Expected indirect punishment

33%
8.5%
$381,000
18 months
$10,687
0.5 months
$193,000
11%
$700,590

II. WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMS
Corporate crimes are extremely difficult to detect because the harms
caused by these crimes are often invisible. While unlawful business
activities, such as false financial disclosure and illegal marketing, cause harm
to society, the victims often do not realize that they are victims. Furthermore,
because of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders
about corporate activities, collecting evidence is difficult for enforcement
agencies.19 Moreover, in corporate crimes, executives often order illegal
strategies but are not engaged in day-to-day conduct.20 Thus, obtaining
evidence of executives’ criminal involvement is difficult.
Whistleblowers can solve these difficulties by providing inside
information to enforcement agencies. They often have access to critical
evidence as corporate insiders and can increase the probabilities of both
crime detection and executive prosecution. In the case of the defective
airbags of Takata, a Japanese automotive parts company, employees’
18. Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Criminal Procedure: Fairness and Deterrence, 11 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1991); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 586 (1994).
19. Masaki Iwasaki, Effects of External Whistleblower Rewards on Internal Reporting 6
(Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 76, 2018), http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Iwasaki_76.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/K73U-SJUX].
20. Iwasaki, supra note 7, at 2.
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whistleblowing led to the indictment of the company’s executives as well as
the largest automotive recall in U.S. history.21 Proof of corporate crime
requires knowledge of companies’ business and technology, and potential
whistleblowers, such as employees, are in the best position to help
enforcement agencies.
In fact, many jurisdictions have increasingly relied on whistleblowers to
detect corporate crimes. Over the past three decades, a large number of
countries have established whistleblower legislation to protect
whistleblowers from wrongdoers’ retaliation.22 In addition, some countries,
such as the United States, Canada, and South Korea, have provided monetary
rewards to incentivize whistleblowers.23 Whistleblowers need time and
effort to collect evidence; furthermore, they are exposed to the risk of
retaliation, such as dismissal, all of which can be significant costs to them.
Therefore, whistleblower protection laws and reward programs can improve
the balance of the personal benefits and costs of whistleblowing and
encourage corporate insiders to blow the whistle.
The United States has whistleblower reward programs for several
categories of crime, such as securities and tax fraud, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) program under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act24 has recently expanded. In this
program, whistleblowers can receive a reward when they provide original
information that leads to an enforcement action in which more than
$1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered.25 Whistleblower rewards range from 10
percent to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions imposed on corporations.26
Since the establishment of the program in 2011, the SEC has paid
approximately $326 million to fifty-nine whistleblowers.27
Figure 1 shows the number of whistleblower tips received by the SEC (the
left vertical axis) and the reward amounts from the Investor Protection Fund
(the “Fund”), from which whistleblowers are paid (the right vertical axis), in
recent fiscal years.28 Both whistleblower tips and reward amounts show a
21. David Shepardson, Takata Whistleblowers to Share $1.7 Million Award, Lawyers Say,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-takatawhistleblowers/takata-whistleblowers-to-share-1-7-million-award-lawyers-sayidUSKBN1H32A2 [https://perma.cc/NUN5-5R5A].
22. Iwasaki, supra note 19, at 7.
23. CAITLIN MASLEN, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMMES 3
(2018),
https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/WhistleblowerReward-Programmes-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT6S-6KF3].
24. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2018).
26. Id.
27. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 1 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7DG-2CTC].
28. The data were taken from the SEC’s annual reports to Congress for the years 2011
through 2018. See Reports and Publications, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=edit-tid&year=All&field_article_sub_type_secart_value=
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rapidly increasing trend in the past eight years, and the most recent numbers
are 5,282 tips and $94 million, respectively. While our interest lies in
whether the SEC’s whistleblower program can improve the deterrence of
corporate crime, empirical studies have shown that the introduction of the
SEC’s whistleblower program reduced accounting fraud significantly.29
Although whistleblower reward programs have already been utilized in the
United States to detect certain types of violations such as securities and tax
fraud, there is room for the expansion and reform of these programs. For
example, expanding the types of violations covered by whistleblower reward
programs may be worth consideration. In fact, Congress passed the Motor
Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act in 2015 to grant rewards for
whistleblowing on automotive safety violations.30 Furthermore, the waiting
period for whistleblowers to receive awards seems long and should probably
be shortened. In the case of the whistleblower reward program of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), it generally takes at least eight years to receive a
reward after filing a claim.31 This would discourage potential whistleblowers
to take action.

Reports+and+Publications-AnnualReports&tid=59 [https://perma.cc/F57X-ZY4E] (last
visited Apr. 28, 2020).
29. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Heemin Lee, Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter
Accounting Fraud? 7 (Mar. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3059231 [https://perma.cc/TV9W-R35R].
30. 49 U.S.C. § 30172 (2018).
31. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy18_wo_annual
_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC2M-LRW7].
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Figure 1: Whistleblowing Tips and Amounts Paid from the Fund

III. CORPORATE SELF-REPORTING SCHEMES
Another option to improve the deterrence of corporate crime is to make
corporations themselves report their crimes. Jennifer Arlen and Reinier
Kraakman suggested that, by granting self-reporting companies rewards in
the form of reduced corporate sanctions, corporate self-reporting schemes
can incentivize companies to self-police and disclose their organizational
members’ crimes.32 If firms have incentive to detect and self-report their
corporate crimes, individual criminals such as executives and employees are
more likely to be prosecuted and suffer the direct punishment, such as fines
and imprisonment. Corporate self-reporting schemes may therefore increase
the expected direct punishment of criminal executives by increasing the
probability of crime detection.
In order for corporate self-reporting schemes to work effectively, several
conditions must be satisfied. First, companies must have effective
compliance systems, and their boards and compliance officers must be
incorruptible enough to self-police and self-report the companies’ offenses.
Second, the expected direct punishment must be severe to a certain extent
even when there are no corporate self-reporting schemes. These schemes
essentially sacrifice the indirect punishment of executives for the direct
punishment of them.33 Reducing corporate sanctions means that the impact
of corporate sanctions on executives’ wealth, such as stocks and options, is
32. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 753 (1997).
33. Iwasaki, supra note 7, at 6.
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also reduced, which decreases the expected indirect punishment of
executives. Even if the probability of crime detection increases by
companies’ self-policing and self-reporting, if the expected direct
punishment is originally too low, the increase in the expected direct
punishment of executives is offset by the decrease in the expected indirect
punishment.
As explained with Table 1, the conditional probability of executive
prosecution, given the detection of a crime, is likely to be low, and thus the
expected direct punishment would not be high relative to the expected
indirect punishment. In this circumstance, the strategy to sacrifice the
indirect punishment for the direct punishment may not be useful, and hence
corporate self-reporting schemes may not work effectively. Although
enforcement agencies such as the SEC and the Department of Justice have
already used corporate self-reporting schemes as an enforcement tool,
deterrence may not have significantly improved.
One way to overcome this impasse is increasing the probabilities of crime
detection and executive prosecution by extensive use of whistleblower tips.
As explained above, whistleblower rewards have potential to increase the
probabilities of executive prosecution as well as crime detection. Moreover,
if employees’ whistleblowing is more likely to occur, companies’ board
members and compliance officers may be more incentivized to self-police
and self-report in an incorruptible manner.
CONCLUSION
The estimate of expected punishment of corporate executives implies that
the level of deterrence may be insufficient in the current enforcement regime.
To improve deterrence, there are two ways: increasing the probability of
crime detection and increasing the conditional probability of executive
prosecution given the crime detection. The proposed Accountability Act
would ease the difficulty of proof in executive prosecution by lowering the
level of mental state required for criminal liability, but the social costs and
benefits of introducing this solution must be carefully evaluated. This Essay
explored other solutions, which can be used to improve deterrence regardless
of the introduction of the Act. The most promising option seems to be the
expansion and reform of whistleblower reward programs. This should also
help corporate self-reporting schemes work more effectively. The combined
use of such whistleblower reward programs and corporate self-reporting
schemes would improve deterrence by increasing the probabilities of crime
detection and executive prosecution.

